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1One of the most consistent sources of confusion and misunderstanding within
the realm of government regulation of foods has been the location of the line
separating that which the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
regulates from that which lies under the purview of the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA). The area in question is that of meat regulation. Beginning as
early as 1884, various statutory enactments, followed in due course by amend-
ment and superseding legislation, have placed the basic authority for monitoring
the wholesomeness of red meat and poultry at the time of slaughter and process-
ing with USDA. These laws coexist with the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act of 1938 (FDCA), however, which grants the FDA general authority to insure
that wholesome, unadulterated, and properly labeled food reaches the American
consuming public. Given the ever-growing role of processing in the production
of food, distinction between red meat and poultry products and all other food
products has become problematic. The regulations which chart this nether re-
gion are marked more by their obscurity than their clarity or consistency. None
of this would pose any diculty were it not for the fact that FDA and USDA
often regulate in radically dierent fashions. The net result has been wide-
ranging duplication of eort and ineciency and nothing short of bewilderment
on the part of consumers and industry. It is unfortunate that such qualities are
associated with agencies to which are conferred the vital mission of protecting
the public health of our country.
As a matter of introduction, a few examples will illustrate the over-
2lap in authority between FDA and USDA, as well as the ne distinctions on
which placement of regulatory authority often turn. Imagine a large soup man-
ufacturer, which produces in one plant both vegetable soup and chicken noodle
soup. The vegetable soup would fall under the authority of FDA. USDA would
regulate the chicken noodle soup, however, provided that it did not contain
\less than 2 percent cooked poultry meat (deboned white or dark poultry meat,
or both) and/or `Mechanically Separated (Kind of Poultry)'."1 As will be dis-
cussed later, FDA would inspect the plant sporadically, while the processing of
the chicken noodle soup could only be proceed in the presence of a USDA Food
Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) inspector. This is all despite the fact that the
potential health hazards of the two soups are nearly identical. The same dupli-
cation will occur in the plant of a frozen dinner manufacturer which produces
both frozen chicken (USDA regulated) and frozen sh (FDA regulated) dinners.2
Regarding the government's \schizophrenic sandwich policy," Judy Quick, chief
of USDA's standard's branch, admitted \It doesn't make any sense, I'll warn
you."3
In addition to USDA/FDA overlap within individual processing plants,
certain processed food items will move back and forth between USDA and FDA
authority as they progress down the chain of production.4 For example, FDA
19 C.F.R. x381.15
2See \Food Regulation: A Case Study of USDA and FDA," in Study on Federal Regulation:
Regulatory Organization, Senate Comm. on Governmental Aairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol.
V, Ch. 4, p. 113, 120 (Comm. Print 1977).
3Carole Sugarman, \Who's Minding the Store?; The Seemingly Senseless Division of Fed-
eral Labeling Authority," Washington Post, May 11, 1988; FDA regulates sandwiches made
with two distinct pieces of bread. On the other hand, the USDA regulates \nontraditional
sandwiches that are either enclosed..., open-faced or partially opened."
4This example taken from \A Case Study of USDA and FDA," note 2, at 117.
3holds authority over live animals which eventually will be eaten.5 USDA as-
sumes jurisdiction once these animals reach the slaughterhouse, where FSIS
personnel conduct ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections. The USDA con-
tinues to exercise authority over the meat and all added ingredients, meat or
non-meat, while the meat is in the processing facility. FDA and USDA share
jurisdiction of the processed food upon its departure from the processing plant.
Although both agencies have jurisdiction over sale of adulterated or misbranded
meat products in retail establishments, only FDA is authorized to inspect such
establishments.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the reasons why such obsta-
cles to eective public health policy exist in the United States. I will begin my
investigation by briey outlining the earlier chronology of meat regulation in
the United States. When I reach the period of time in which poultry inspection
became mandatory, I will engage in a more in depth historical analysis of the
reasons why the system which prevails today developed as it did. This portion
of the paper is based largely upon Congressional hearings, reports, and oor
debate. I will then conclude by noting proposals for reform and oer my own
assessment of division of food regulation between USDA and FDA.
One cannot embark on an analysis of this troubling area without rst
carefully setting out its contours. Congress created the Bureau of Animal In-
dustry within USDA in 1884.6 This Bureau was charged with investigating the
condition, protection, and use of, as well as the presence of disease in domestic
521 U.S.C. x392(b)
623 Stat. 31 (1884)
4animals. Such information was seen as \valuable to the agricultural and com-
mercial interests of the county."7 The creation of this Bureau, distinct from
USDA's Division of Chemistry, which would exercise control over imported and
exported meat beginning in 1890, opened a gulf within the eld of food regula-
tion which has never been bridged.8
The public outcry in response to Upton Sinclair's vivid portrayal in The
Jungle of the horrors of the red meat industry in Chicago motivated Congress in
1906 to enact federal legislation which would regulate food purity.9 The Meat
Inspection Act of 1906 formed part of an appropriations measure, and it covered
only the red meats (pork, beef, lamb, and other non-poultry sources of meat,
not including seafood). In 1907 the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA)10 was
enacted as independent legislative act, but was identical in substance to the 1906
measure. USDA's Bureau of Animal Industries administered the FMIA, which
mandated strict carcass-by-carcass inspection. Also in 1906 Congress enacted
the Pure Food and Drug Act (PFDA).11 It applied to applied to all non-meat
foods and was administered by USDA's Bureau of Chemistry. Thus from the
outset of food regulation in the United States, red meat was regulated by one
branch of USDA, while jurisdiction of all other foods fell under the control of a
dierent branch.
In 1927 Congress reorganized USDA and separated the research and
7Id.
8Peter Barton Hutt and Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation of
Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 2, 53 (1984)
9Id., at 53-54
1021 U.S.C. xx601 et seq.
1134 Stat. 768 (1906), as amended
5regulatory functions of Bureau of Chemistry. The regulatory authority, which
enforced the PFDA now fell under the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Adminis-
tration, still within USDA. In 1931 Congress renamed the Food, Drug, and
Insecticide Administration the Food and Drug Administration.
As time passed and food processing become both more prevalent and
more sophisticated, the PFDA came increasingly to be seen as inadequate. For
example, there existed no legal standards for foods, FDA lacked the ability
to inspect warehouses, and many dangerous additives lay beyond the scope of
FDA's regulatory authority.12 Conspicuously absent as well were provisions
which would enable FDA to police false and misleading claims made about
food.13 Five years after the bill was rst introduced in 1933, Congress enacted
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,14 which accomplished a signicant modern-
ization and strengthening of the PFDA.15 As before, jurisdiction to enforce the
wholesomeness and labeling of foods lay in the hands of FDA. In 1940 Congress
removed FDA from USDA and placed it in the newly created Federal Security
Agency. In 1953 FDA was moved again, this time being placed in the new
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which was renamed the De-
partment of Health and Human Services in 1979.
Despite the fact that FDA was relocated to what was perceived as a
more consumer-conscious agency in 1940, USDA retained its long-standing re-
sponsibility for meat inspection and other aspects of meat regulation. Thus in
12Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law (2d. Ed. 1991), 11
13Id.
1421 U.S.C. xx301 et seq.
15Id., at 11-12
61940 for the rst time red meat was regulated by personnel of an agency com-
pletely distinct from that which policed the remainder of the American food
supply. As a result of the division an incongruity developed which was becom-
ing ever-the-more obvious by the 1950's, namely that red meat was subjected
to the highest scrutiny while the poultry industry enjoyed relatively little gov-
ernment intrusion. Jurisdiction over poultry at that time remained with FDA
under the FDCA; budgetary and personnel constraints dictated that FDA in-
spectors visit a given plant only once every three or four years.16 This fact
is quite shocking when compared with the rules governing red meat under the
FMIA, which directed that each carcass be inspected and that no processing
take place absent the supervision of a USDA inspector. Meanwhile the poultry
industry, owing largely to the advent and widespread use of refrigeration, was
growing by leaps and bounds.
Such growth was not without its attendant problems; some estimated
in the mid-1950's that the culprit responsible for fully one-third of all food
poisoning-related illness was poultry.17 Shirley Barker, Director of the Poultry
Department of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America (AFL-CIO), noted in his statement that twenty-six dierent diseases
were transferable from poultry to humans.18 These diseases threatened not just
16Letter of Charles Crawford, Commissioner of the FDA to Leonar Sullivan, Representative
from Missouri, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Poultry and Eggs of the Committee on
Agriculture, House of Representatives, 84th Congress, 2d Session, on Compulsory Poultry
Inspection, July 17, 1956, p. 8
17Statement by Senator Murray, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Legislation Aecting
the Food and Drug Administration of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United
States Senate, 84th Congress, 2d Session, on S. 3176, May 9, 1956, p. 1
18Id., at 102. These diseases are: Bacterial (Erysipelas, Listeriosis, Tuberculosis, Tu-
laremia, Staphylococcosis), Streptococcosis, Salmonellosis, Diptheria, Brucellosis, Paracolon
infections, Pseudotuberculosis, Fungal (Aspergillosis, Favus, Thrush, Sarcosporidiosis), Vi-
7the consuming public, but also the workers employed by the poultry processing
industry.19 In addition that very year a psittacosis epidemic broke out in Ore-
gon and two people perished.20
The health concerns posed by poultry were rst addressed in 1928,
when USDA began to oer a voluntary inspection and grading service to poul-
try processors who were willing to foot the bill. This program was structured
along the lines of the mandatory program under the FMIA, but the service
was carried out by a dierent division of USDA. Personnel in the Red Meat
Division of the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) performed the inspections
required by the FMIA, while personnel in the Poultry Division of the Agri-
cultural Marketing Service (AMS) ran the voluntary inspections. The poultry
program received ocial Congressional recognition in 1946 with the Agricultural
Marketing Act,21 which extended the program to fruits and vegetables. This
program has three components: an inspection service, a grading service, and a
sanitation monitoring service. Producers supported such a program because the
\USDA approved" seals promised to augmented consumer condence in poul-
try. Nevertheless, only between twenty and twenty-ve percent of all poultry
ral and viral-like (Eastern equine encephalomyelitis, Western equine encephalomyelitis, St.
Louis encephalitis, Japanese B. encephalitis, Newcastle disease, Psittacosis, Rabies), Toxic
(Tetanus, Botulism), Parasitic (Echinostomiasis, Schistosomiasis, Dermanyssus gallinae, Tex-
eplasmosis).
19See generally id., at 170 et seq, where the following studies are presented: Poultry San-
itation Standards, 41 American Journal of Public Health No. 8 (Aug. 1951); Salmonellosis
in Poultry and Poultry Processing Plants in Florida, 16 American Journal of Veterinary Re-
search No. 58 (Jan. 1955); Diseases of Poultry Transmissible to Man, 13 Iowa State College
Veterinarian No. 2 (1951); Poultry Inspection as Part of the Public Health Program, 112 Jour-
nal of the American Veterinary Medical Association No. 850 (Jan. 1948); Poultry Diseases as
Public Health Problems, from Public Health Reports, Federal Security Agency, Public Health
Service, May 25, 1951.
20Statement of Victor Anfuso, Representative from New York, Hearing on S. 3176, note
17, at 59
217 U.S.C. xx1621 et seq.
8was inspected in this fashion.22 Beyond this, FDA made occasional seizures un-
der the FDCA of unwholesome, adulterated, or misbranded products injected
into interstate commerce.
By the mid-1950's all agreed that these actions fell woefully short of the
sort of vigilance necessary to insure that only safe poultry products entered the
market. The following candid exchange took place between FDA Commissioner
John Harvey and Senator Bender:
Senator Bender: \Do you think the present enforcement of the Food and
Drug Act which includes poultry is adequate?"
Mr. Harvey: \No, sir."
Senator Bender: \You feel that there is a need for some additional steps being
taken by Congress in order to protect the public in this matter?"
Mr. Harvey: \With regard to poultry, I do; yes, sir."23
With the success of the fty-year-old mandatory inspection program of red
meat obvious to everyone involved, a natural solution to the problems in the
poultry industry would be creation of a parallel agency devoted to mandatory
poultry inspection. Indeed, in over nine hundred pages of testimony in three
separate Congressional hearings on the matter, not one witness voiced his or
her objection to compulsory poultry inspection.24
Given the consensus that compulsory poultry inspection should be
instituted, the point of dispute came to be over which agency would do the in-
specting. FDA was regarded as a consumer protection agency above all else and
22Statement by Hermon Miller, Director, Poultry Division, AMS, Hearing on Compulsory
Poultry Inspection, note 16, at 92
23Hearing on S. 3176, note 17, at 18-19
24S. Rep. No. 129, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), p. 1; Statement of Mr. McIntire,
Congressional Record, July 9, 1957, p. 11120.
9had always enjoyed jurisdiction over poultry. USDA, while holding agricultural
interests at heart, could boast fty years of experience in dealing with a manda-
tory inspection program (the red meat program run by ARS) and twenty-eight
years of experience in intensive poultry inspections (the voluntary service coor-
dinated by AMS).
The rst eort at instituting mandatory poultry inspection was made
by Senator Murray with his bill, S. 3176, which he introduced in 1956. With this
bill Murray proposed to amend the FDCA by appending to it a chapter dealing
with poultry. Among other things, the new chapter would mandate bird-by-bird
post mortem inspection, conducted by FDA. He justied his proposal as follows,
\There appears to be some disagreement about where the poultry inspection
work should be done. It is my own very strong belief that since protection of
consumers is the fundamental objective of inspection, that work should go to
the FDA in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare."25 Murray
found extensive support among public health and consumer-oriented ocials
for placing authority with FDA.26 Murray's supporters overwhelmingly pointed
to the diering missions of USDA and FDA when justifying their opinion. One
such witness stated, \I believe that by placing the responsibility of poultry in-
spection in the Federal FDA, the protection of the consumer's health will be of
primary concern, whereas consumer interests will be secondary if the responsi-
25Hearing on S. 3176, note 17, at 1
26See e.g., Statement of Dr. Aaron Haskin, Health Ocer, Dept. of Health, Newark, NJ,
id., at 213; Statement of representatives of the Conference of Public Health Veterinarians
and the General Federation of Women's Clubs, id., at 216-217; Statement of Francis Wright,
President of Housewives United, id., at 229; Statement of Dan Schlosser, Chairman, Meat
and Poultry Committee, the Association of Food and Drug Ocials of the US, id., at 205;
Statement of Shirley Barker, id., at 99; Statement of J. Robert Cameron, Assistant Manager,
Department of Health and Hospitals, City and County of Denver, Colo., id., at 93.
10bility is placed with the Department of Agriculture," which he referred to as a
\non-health agency."27
In opposition to such groups appeared members of the poultry indus-
try, who testied to a man that authority should lie with USDA. USDA wanted
jurisdiction over the new program, and expressed its preference for it.28 These
witnesses argued that Congress should take advantage of the USDA's experience
with compulsory red meat inspection and voluntary poultry inspection.29 This
approach did not strike a chord with the subcommittee, which stated:
In the defense of its marketing-oriented poultry inspection, [USDA] has made
contradictory, misleading, inaccurate and exaggerated statements to our sub-
committee. This subcommittee cannot have any condence in the discretion of
an agency or ocials who make an ocial presentation of a matter aecting
the health, welfare, and lives of citizens in such a loose manner. The Poultry
Branch of the AMS has alienated the support of veterinarians, State food and
drug ocials, farm organizations, labor unions, housewives, and organizations
of consumers { all of whom supported compulsory inspection in some other
agency { by its conduct of the voluntary poultry inspection program. We have
no diculty understanding why.30
Despite the broad base of support enjoyed by S. 3176, the bill was amended
such that authority was placed with USDA. This is despite the fact that the
subcommittee continued to support FDA jurisdiction over the compulsory poul-
try program.31 The reason for this revision is quite remarkable: FDA, through
Commission Harvey and the Secretary of the Department of HEW M.B. Fol-
som, actually declined to accept the larger role. When asked his impression of
27Statement of J. Robert Cameron, Assistant Manager, Department of Health and Hospi-
tals, City and County of Denver, Colo., id., at 93 and 92.
28Statement of Earl Butz, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, id., at 22
29Id.
30S-Rep. No. 129, note 24, at 10-11
31Id., at 1
11Murray's bill, Harvey stated:
[We like the thrust of the bill]. However, for two important reasons, we
believe that this program, instead of being placed in the FDA as proposed by
this bill, should be placed in the Department of Agriculture. In the rst place,
we feel that this is good commonsense. That Department is already charged with
administration of the FMIA, which is the only existing mandatory inspection
program for meats and meshes with the Federal FDCA. [They can exploit their
fty years of experience. Secondly,] in all candor the FDA is not presently in a
good position to develop a poultry inspection service of the magnitude indicated
by this bill.... This is not, Mr. Chairman, a case where the FDA is the only
organization of the Government that can perform the proposed task.32
Later in the same hearing, Harvey elaborated:
If the FDA had enough people to inspect all of this poultry and insure that
no bad poultry got into the markets, there would not be any occasion for sitting
here, and talking about the type of legislation that we are. However, whether
that would be the correct approach to this particular problem is a question....
[B]earing in mind that the poultry industry has sprung up like a mushroom in
the last few years...[w]e think that the conditions are analogous to the situation
that we had with red meat back in 1906. Because of the public-health problems
involved, as well as the other problems of fairness and decency in marketing
that are involved, the type of inspection which passes all of the birds under
individual scrutiny as contrasted with [FDA's ad hoc, periodic] inspection...
[T]he complete inspection is necessary in this commodity. I do not think [the
complete inspection] would be done with respect to oranges, or thousands of
other foods that I might name.33
Harvey's sentiments were echoed by Folsom in his letter to Lister Hill, Chair-
man of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, dated May 9, 1956:
We believe that in view of the fact that the Department of Agriculture is
already responsible for the only other mandatory Federal meat inspection pro-
gram... the poultry inspection program proposed by this bill should likewise be
entrusted to that Department. This would make it possible for the Secretary
of Agriculture to maintain, as far as practicable, uniform enforcement policy
among the dierent meat products, including poultry. Moreover, in order to
carry out the provisions of this bill, a new and separate unit in the FDA would
have to be created.... Such a unit would have to be developed from the ground
up. It appears inexpedient from the standpoint of the broad public interest for
the FDA to undertake the added burden of establishing and maintaining a ser-
vice of this kind at a time when it is tremendously concerned with the expansion
of its sta and facilities for general coverage and adequate enforcement of the
32Hearing on S. 3176, note 17, at 11-12
33Id., at 20
12FDC Act as a whole.... A new poultry inspection service as contemplated in this
bill would in our judgment seriously interfere with and overtax the expansion
of facilities of the FDA to the detriment of the public generally...34
The bill reported favorably by the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry,
S. 4243 (which placed authority with USDA) was announced on the house oor
and passed over.35
Members of Congress apparently took FDA's words to heart; all of the poul-
try inspection bill introduced after the failure of the Murray bill placed authority
with USDA.36 None were acted upon before the end of the 1956 session.
In the next session of Congress a number of compulsory inspection bills
were introduced, each of which placed authority within USDA.37 The dispute in
these hearings centered around whether Congress should mandate that the new
program be placed in ARS alongside the red meat inspection program, mandate
that the program be developed out of the voluntary poultry inspection program
in AMS, or leave the matter to the Secretary's discretion. Many of the witnesses
who had testied in 1956 that authority should be placed with the FDA now
34Id., at 7
35Congressional Record, July 23, 1956, p. 13906
36Representative Leonar Sullivan, who introduced a bill which would have amended FMIA to
include poultry, stated that there existed proposed legislation \which provided for compulsory
poultry inspection by the FDA.... [I]t was my view [however] that it would be better to lodge
this assignment with the meat inspection branch of the Department of Agriculture because I
knew the FDA is and has been terribly undermanned and is and has been unable to obtain
sucient funds to do the tremendous job we have already placed upon its shoulders. In recent
weeks, the FDA has denitely gone on record against being given the powers to administer a
compulsory inspection law. The Department of Agriculture, meanwhile, has gone on record
as promising eective administration of a compulsory poultry inspection law... " Hearing on
Compulsory Poultry Inspection, note 16, at 14-15.
37H.R. 12, H.R. 5398, H.R. 377, H.R. 514, H.R. 767, H.R. 899, H.R. 1964, H.R. 3052, H.R.
4357, H.R. 5403, H.R. 5463, H.R. Rep. No. 465, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1957), reprinted in
1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1630-1631.
13asserted that the poultry program should be housed in ARS.38 Their justi-
cation was basically the same as before, with \ARS" replacing \FDA." These
witnesses felt that ARS had a more legitimate consumer protection orientation,
while AMS existed expressly to promote the interests of agricultural producers.
Not surprisingly, representatives of the poultry industry favored location of the
compulsory inspection program within AMS. They emphasized that poultry was
now an industry on par with red meat and should not be \subordinated" to it
in ARS.39 Some were rather dismissive of this justication, as Leonar Sullivan
stated that there \has been so much made by some of the industry witnesses
here over the necessity for keeping the program under AMS that one begins to
think there is perhaps too close a relationship there."40 Finally, USDA witnesses
favored leaving the matter to the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture.41
The Committee on Agriculture eventually drafted a clean bill, H.
38Letter from D.B. Schlosser, Chairman, Committee on Meat and Poultry Inspection, As-
sociation of Food and Drug Ocials of the United States to Mr. Watts, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Poultry and Eggs of the Committee on Agriculture, House of Representa-
tives, 85th Congress, 1st Session, on Compulsory Inspection of Poultry and Poultry Products,
March 6, 1957, p. 60; Letter from Henry Holle, M.D., member of Public Health-Poultry
Industry Liaison Committee to Mr. Watts, id., at 106; Statement of Dr. Oscar Sussman,
Association of State Public Health Veterinarians, NJ State Department of Health, id., at 158;
Statement of Dr. Aaron Haskin, Health Ocer, City of Newark, NJ, id., at 177; Statement of
Shirley Barker, Director of the Poultry Department, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, id., at 207; Statement of Dr. Max Hubbard, State
Public Health Veterinarian, Virginia State Department of Health, on behalf of Conference of
Public Health Veterinarians, id., at 224; Statement of Mrs. James Booras, Assistant Leg-
islative Chairman, Housewives United, id., at 231; Statement of Mrs. Genevieve Oslund, on
behalf of Mrs. R.I. C. Prout, President, General Federation of Women's Clubs, id., at 233.
39Statement of Wallace Jerome, Director, Wisconsin Turkey Federation, id., at 55; State-
ment of John A. Wineld, NC Department of Agriculture, id., at 70; Statement of Cli Car-
penter, President, Institute of American Poultry Industries, id., at 75; Statement of Harold
Klahold, President, Northeastern Poultry Producers Council, id., at 91; Statement of Robert
R. Parks, Executive Director and Past President, American Poultry and Hatchery Federa-
tion, id., at 112; Statement of J.O. Kumpe, Manager of Arkansas Poultry Cooperative, id., at
114-115.
40Id., at 270
41Statement of Earl Butz, Assistant Secretary of USDA, id., at 10
146814,42 which the House passed.43 The Senate passed S. 1747 on April 8,
1957.44 Although these bill were quite similar, both enacting new legislation
placing authority for the new program with USDA, a conference committee was
called to resolve the dierence.45 The Senate bill passed in lieu of the House
bill,46 but the compromise bill which emerged from the conference committee
was in fact essentially the House version. When the President signed into law
the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA)47 on August 28, 1957, he charged
the USDA with the duty to embark on a mandatory inspection program of the
poultry industry comparable to that which regulated the red meat industry.
According to the Senate report which accompanied the bill the purpose of the
bill
is to establish a system of compulsory inspection by the Federal Government
of poultry and poultry products in interstate commerce and in major intrastate
consuming areas of such size and consequence as to necessarily aect interstate
commerce. Such inspection would be rounded out by requirements as to the
maintenance of sanitary facilities and practices and as to correct and informative
labeling of products.48
The PPIA calls for carcass-by-carcass post mortem inspections of all poultry,
while the Secretary may direct ante mortem inspection in his discretion.
Thus as of 1957 there prevailed three primary statutes governing food
regulation in the United States, namely the FDCA, FMIA, and PPIA, with
two regulatory agencies to enforce them, USDA and FDA. So who regulates
42H.R. Rep. No. 465, note 37, at 1630
43Congressional Record, July 9, 1957, p. 11115.
44Congressional Record, April 8, 1957, p. 5228.
45Conf. Rep. No. 1170, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1637
46Congressional Record, pp. 13478, 15420, and 15544.
4721 U.S.C. xx451 et seq.
48H.R. Rep. No. 465, note 37, at 1630
15what? The answer depends on what food product you are interested in and
what point in time you are concerned about. Generally speaking, the FMIA
and the PPIA confer upon USDA the power to regulate red meat and poultry
at the slaughtering and processing plants. As the examples included in the
introduction illustrate, however, such a generally statement has little meaning
in a modern world where most foods are processed. The question is often more
fundamental: what actually constitutes a red meat or a poultry product?
As noted above, looking to see whether a product which contains two
percent red meat or poultry is a good rule of thumb for determining whether it
is to be regulated as a meat or non-meat product. One complication is that even
when a product includes greater than a threshold amount of meat, it will not
be considered a meat product if it \is not represented as a poultry [or red meat]
product" or \historically [has] not been considered by consumers as products of
the poultry [or red meat] industry."49
Beyond these general rules, the inquiry becomes more obscure. To
make matters worse, the three Acts make no mention of each other outside a
few cryptic references. As a result there exists a gray area
in which a determination of FDA's authority to regulate red meat or poul-
try products depends upon an analysis of the extent of FDA's authority after
passage of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1938 and whether a particu-
lar action by the Department of Agriculture would occur pursuant to authority
granted to USDA before or after 1938.50
According to the PPIA, poultry and poultry products are exempt from the
FDCA \to the extent of the application or extension thereto of the provisions of
499 C.F.R. x381.15
50\A Case Study of USDA and FDA," note 2, at 116
16this chapter, except that the provisions of this chapter shall not derogate from
any authority conferred by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prior to
August 18, 1968."51 Similarly, the FMIA contains language to the extent that
\notwithstanding any other provisions of law... the provisions of this chapter
shall not derogate from any authority conferred by the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act prior to December 15, 1967."52 To close the triangle, the FDCA
provides that \meats and meat food products shall be exempt from the provi-
sions of this chapter to the extent of the application or the extension thereto
of the Federal Meat Inspection Act, approved March 4, 1907, as amended."53
This mish-mash of self-reference requires that one compare the FDCA with the
FMIA in order to resolve exactly what authority over meat FDA received in
1938.54
The jurisdictional lines in this gray area can be summed up in this
way:55 any authority granted by Congress to USDA in 1907 remains the ex-
clusive province of USDA. Inspection of slaughterhouses and meat processing
facilities represents one such example. The FDCA, by the terms of 21 U.S.C.
x392(a), can have no impact on authority already bestowed upon USDA. Any
authority granted USDA after 1938 is not exclusive if there is overlapping au-
thority granted to FDA by FDCA. Thus where FDA has received additional
authority which does not overlap with authority given USDA under the FMIA
in 1907, FDA can proceed under that authority against all food products, includ-
5121 U.S.C. x467f(a)
5221 U.S.C. x679
5321 U.S.C. x392(a)
54\A Case Study of USDA and FDA," note 2, at 116
55See id., at 116
17ing meat. Amendments to the FMIA and PPIA, most notably the Wholesome
Meat and Poultry Acts of 1967 and 1968, even where they expanded USDA
competence into realms formerly occupied by the FDA alone, do not take au-
thority away from the FDA; jurisdiction is concurrent.56 For example, FDA
retains the power to set common or usual names for meat-containing products,
given the fact that this authority was granted to USDA after passage of FDCA
in 1938.57
If this analysis appears confusing today, based on Congressional hear-
ing testimony and debate on the oor of Congress in 1956 and 1957, Members
of Congress found the issue no less dicult. Their statements reveal that even
at the very birth of PPIA there existed no clear consensus about what exactly
was being done with respect to FDA's and USDA's authority. The following
exchange between Commissioner Harvey and Senator McNamara illustrates this
lack on consensus. In it the Senator attempts to pin Harvey down on the con-
tours of FDA/USDA jurisdiction, something Harvey was not willing (or able)
to do. The debate centered around S. 3176, the bill mentioned above which
would have amended FDCA to grant jurisdiction over the new poultry program
to FDA.
Mr. Harvey: [Regarding current scope of FDA regulation] \Yes [poultry is
included]; there is red meat that is included only to the extent that the Meat
Inspection Act does not apply, but laws of the type that we have before us
proposed here, and like the Meat Inspection Act, deal rmly with the condition
and wholesomeness of the food product at the time of inspection. But these
products are perishable in nature and in many instances there comes a time
56Id.
57Id., at 133, citing American Frozen Food Institute v. Mathews, 413 F.Supp. 548 (D.D.C.
1976), a'd sub. nom, American Frozen Food Institute v. Califano, 555 F.2d 1059 (D.D.C.
1977).
18when it is still the FDA's job to deal with it in the channels of commerce and
trade when it may have changed its conditions."
...
Senator McNamara: [McNamara recited USDA's statement that \processed
poultry moving in interstate commerce must meet requirements of the FDCA
which is administered by the FDA.... This agency has the responsibility and
the authority to prevent adulterated, unwholesome, and misbranded products
from reaching the consuming public."] \Do you disagree with that?"
Mr. Harvey: \I do not disagree."
Senator McNamara: \There is nothing in the present legislation then, that
would prohibit you from entering into this eld, without any new legislation; is
that correct?"
Mr. Harvey: \I think, perhaps, Senator, since this proposal here is the sta-
tioning of inspectors, and a signicant number of inspectors, in each individual
plant, and providing inspectors for the inspection of live poultry, that is beyond
the comprehension { this provides for an inspection of good birds, bad birds,
and all birds. It makes it mandatory that such birds be inspected and marked
before they can enter into interstate commerce. That exceeds the provisions of
the regulatory authority under the FDCA that is applicable to poultry and to
all foods to insure its soundness and wholesomeness, but not with the machinery
and the mechanics that are provided here."
Senator McNamara: \Well, then, you do not feel that you are prohibited under
the existing legislation from doing this obvious job?"
Mr. Harvey: \Providing plant inspection, you mean?"
Senator McNamara: \Yes, that is right."
Mr. Harvey: \I do not think we are prohibited; no, sir."
Senator McNamara: \If that is the logical conclusion, we need no additional
legislation; is that correct?"
Mr. Reidy: \I would feel that since the FDA has not been inspecting plants,
and apparently both producer and consumer groups have all agreed that there
should be mandatory inspections, Mr. Harvey would like the authority spelled
out, and certainly he needs something that would provide the funds and person-
nel with which to do it, although his position, as I gather from his statement,
is that he feels under present circumstances, that the red-meat division of the
Department of Agriculture is in a better position to take on the job."58
While the issue of whether under FDCA the FDA could have engaged in a
system of bird-by-bird post mortem inspection was never resolved, in the 1957
hearings and debates leading up to the passage of the PPIA, it became clear
that authority was being taken from FDA and given to USDA. Representative
58Hearing on S. 3176, note 17, at 13-20
19Homan expressed his feeling that PPIA \seems to show a lack of condence
in the FDA because it expressly takes away the jurisdiction of that Department
and puts enforcement as well as administration under the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Agriculture."59
The implications of this move, while not discussed at length, did not escape
the attention of a few perceptive Congressmen, as the following passage reveals:
Mr. Homan: \This bill confers upon the Department of Agriculture some
duties which are now given to the Food and Drug Department or agency for the
protection of our food, does it not?"
Mr. Watts: \No; I do not think it does. The [FDCA] usually [applies to] the
marketing end of the business.... It does not take away from the Pure Food
and Drug Department anything that it is now doing. But it does confer upon
the Department of Agriculture the authority to inspect the plants. After the
product leaves the plant it is up to the Pure Food and Drug Department to
supervise the movement of it, and to see that it does not spoil on the way to
market and that it is not put on the market in a spoiled or bad condition."
Mr. Homan: \Well, as I understand the Food and Drug Department, does it
not have jurisdiction to prevent fraud and to see that we get wholesome food
and unadulterated drugs?"
Mr. Watts: \Well, certainly that comes within the purview of it.... But they
have a limited number of inspectors."
Mr. Homan: \And one purpose of this bill is to give the Department of Agri-
culture jurisdiction to see that we get pure food, unspoiled food."
Mr. Watts: \It gives the Department of Agriculture the right and the duty
to furnish inspectors, but it does not destroy the rights of the Pure Food and
Drug."
Mr. Homan: \I understand that. But, the bill does direct the Department
of Agriculture, does it not, to see that we do not get diseased or unwholesome
food, primarily poultry."
Mr. Watts: \That is right, sir."
Mr. Homan: \But it does not provide for any inspection between the time
the retail merchant gets the poultry and the time he sells it, does it?"
Mr. Watts: \It does not provide for any inspection from the time it leaves
the processing plant until it is sold to the consumer."
...
Mr. Reece: \I am not complaining about the jurisdiction being transferred from
59Congressional Record, July 9, 1957, p.11152
20the Pure FDA to the Department of Agriculture, but I do think it does give
the Department of Agriculture jurisdiction over matter that not fall within the
scope of the Pure FDA.
...
Mr. Homan: \Well... as was admitted by [Mr. Watts] we do have a FDA
charged with the duty of protecting us from... eating spoiled or unwholesome
poultry. They have plenty of money and they have an adequate sta of ex-
perts. So why confer practically equal authority and impose similar duties on
the Department of Agriculture? We hear a great deal of talk of the need for
economy.... But here we are again today, as we are so often, enacting new leg-
islation creating new employees to do something that an executive department
is already charged with doing. Will we get any better result?... In the end...
you have not protected the consumer [because there is no protection once the
poultry leaves the processor.]
...
Mr. Reece: [Mr. Homan] spoke about one very important point for considera-
tion here, that is, the FDA now exercises certain responsibilities to see that the
public gets wholesome food, whether it is chicken or something else. When the
inspection of poultry is put under the Department of Agriculture and carries the
stamp that it is inspected by the Department of Agriculture, the whole tendency
of the FDA, I fear, is going to be to withdraw completely from that eld. It is
admitted here that the Department of Agriculture itself is not going to follow on
through to where the poultry is protected all the way to the consuming public."
Mr. Homan: \[The bill] is unnecessary because it duplicates the service which
the Food and Drug Department is now authorized and equipped to render. It
should be defeated."60
To summarize then, it is clear from the testimony quoted above that while
Congress recognized that PPIA would to some extent take from FDA and give
to USDA, the precise boundaries of authority were no more clear in their minds
then as they are in ours today. Certain Members anticipated that the structure
erected by the PPIA would result in duplication of eort and ineciency. This
leaves one to ask what, in practice, are the problems related to the dual system
Congress created, if in fact there are any.
60Congressional Record, July 15, 1957, p. 11719-11720
21While the missions of USDA and FDA are the same, namely to prevent adul-
terated and misbranded food from entering the marketplace, there are marked
dierences in the inspection procedures of FSIS and FDA.61 FSIS engages in
\continuous inspection" at every slaughterhouse and meat processing plant in
the United States. These facilities may only operate while an inspector is on
duty, and every item must receive FSIS's stamp of approval.62 FDA inspectors,
on the other hand, visit food processing plants only sporadically.63 Although
they visit \high risk" plants more often,64 FDA employs no policy approaching
continuous inspection or item-by-item scrutiny.
In addition, USDA must grant prior approval of meat processing plant
blueprints, while FDA need not even be notied of new food plants.65 USDA
also enjoys a statutory right to examine company records,66 while FDA can
neither inspect nor subpoena such records. This reduces FDA to mere reliance
on the good will manufacturers, who often refuse to provide FDA with the doc-
umentation it desires.67
USDA establishes the labeling requirements for products containing
red meat or poultry, while FDA does so for all other food products. Although
the statutory provisions are similar,68 \USDA and FDA have asserted vastly
61These dierences are set out in \A Case Study of USDA and FDA," note 2, at 117-120,
128-133.
6221 U.S.C x455 places the extent of ante mortem inspections to take place within the
discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary may also in his discretion dispense
with continuous inspection.
63See note 16 supra and surrounding text.
64\A Case Study of USDA and FDA," note 2, at 119 (note 29).
65Id., at 119
6621 U.S.C. x460(b)
67\A Case Study of USDA and FDA," note 2, at 119-120
68Compare 21 U.S.C. x457(e) of the PPIA with 21 U.S.C. x331 of the FDCA.
22dierent authorities for carrying out this responsibility."69 USDA engages in
an unwieldy system of premarket screening, while FDA regulations set out the
requirements which control the labeling of foods falling under the jurisdiction
of FDA. In this context the fact that FDA cannot force information disclosure
places another obstacle in its path, hampering its policing of false or mislead-
ing labels. To make matters worse, according to one observer, \[d]espite the
similarity of their mandates, the obvious inter-relationship of their actions, and
the often tenuous jurisdictional lines which divide them, USDA and FDA have
failed to develop any coordinated, long-range food labeling policy."70
The resource gap between FDA and USDA is staggering. As of 1993,
FSIS operated on a budget of $600,000,000 and committed 9,000 employees to
the inspection of 6,100 meat and poultry processors a year. FDA, on the other
hand, received only $900,000,000 to cover the costs of its regulatory operations,
including each of the food, drug, and cosmetic programs. FDA's sta of 1,000
inspectors is responsible for some 53,000 non-meat food producers, not to men-
tion execution of other FDA duties.71
The PPIA has not remained in static form since its enactment in 1957.
Eleven years later it was amended by the Wholesome Poultry Products Act
(the FMIA was also updated in 1967). The new Act sought to modernize the
PPIA and to improve its operation, by stimulating \cooperation with appropri-
ate State agencies with respect to poultry products inspection programs"72 as
69\A Case Study of USDA and FDA," note 2, at 129
70Id., at 130
71These gures appeared in Marian Burros, \Clinton Plan Would Move Meat and Poultry
Inspections to FDA" New York Times, Sept. 13, 1993.
72H.R. Rep. No. 1333, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3426
23well as by coordinating \the activities of the inspection forces of the Department
of Agriculture with those of the personnel from the FDA... for most eective
use of their combined resources in protecting the consumer from unwholesome,
adulterated, or misbranded poultry."73 Congress hoped that with this Act the
thirteen percent (some 1.6 billion pounds) of the poultry slaughtered each year
in the United States which escaped Federal inspection under the PPIA would
now be covered.74
The mandatory inspection programs of the USDA fell under the Ani-
mal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), while the voluntary program
remained under AMS. When Congress reorganized the USDA in March of 1977,
it shifted responsibility for the voluntary inspections services from AMS to the
newly-created Commodity Services (CS). CS made up a division within the also-
newly-created Food Safety and Quality Services (FSQS). In addition, APHIS
lost control of the mandatory meat and poultry inspection program; Congress
transferred it to the newly-created Meat and Poultry Inspection division, also
within the FSQS. Today APHIS is involved only in the USDA's regulation of
live animals. The Secretary of Agriculture instituted further reorganization on
September 30, 1981, when the poultry and red meat programs were moved again.
This time they came to rest in the newly-created Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS), where they are still housed today, within the Meat and Poultry
Inspection division.75
We are left then with a dual system which results in ineciency and
73Id., at 3428
74Id., at 3427
757 C.F.R. x2.53
24waste, as well as uncertainty and confusion. The qualities are all the more
tragic given that they mar the regulation of food safety, itself critical to the
maintenance of our nation's public health. As a critical observed noted, \this
bifurcated system demands close communication and cooperation between FDA
and USDA eld personnel when enforcement action becomes necessary { com-
munication and cooperation that have not always been forthcoming."76
The split of authority \results in certain regulatory needs `falling through the
cracks' or in partial enactment where one of the two agencies drags its feet."77
For example, in 1974, two Georgia natives died from botulism contained in
canned stew beef. This product was under the jurisdiction of USDA, which
demanded less of the producer than would have the FDA. If FDA regulations
had applied to the beef stew, the tragedy may have been averted.78
Beyond these structural problems lies a more basic problem of the split
in authority between USDA and FDA. Many still question whether USDA has
the true interests of the consuming public at heart, doubts rst voiced when the
PPIA was considered.79 As stated above, USDA's fundamental mission to pro-
mote agribusiness and agricultural interests is seen by many as in conict with,
or even incompatible with, the goals of insuring the public health and protect-
ing the American consumer from harmful food products. This issue is especially
germane when comparing the functions of the CS and the FSIS.80 The Meat
and Poultry Inspection division of FSIS and FDA look for unwholesomeness,
76\A Case Study of USDA and FDA," note 2, at 122
77Id.
78This example appear in \A Case Study of USDA and FDA," note 2, at 124.
79See supra note 28 and surrounding text, and supra note 40 and surrounding text.
80This comparison is made in \A Case Study of USDA and FDA," note 2, at 125-128.
25adulteration, and unsanitary conditions as a proxy for threats to the public
health. CS division inspectors only set foot in food plants at the invitation of
their owners, for the limited purposes of providing the producer with \USDA
grade" labels. These are of value to the producer for marketing reasons; such
labels attract customers. Thus the Meat and Poultry Inspection division and
the FDA \inspect for health-related characteristics relating to wholesomeness of
food products, while CS is concerned primarily with the economic value of the
food."81 CS is concerned with aesthetics in terms of the role it plays in mar-
keting; FDA and the Meat and Poultry Inspection division concern themselves
with aesthetics only to the extent that it indicates unhealthfulness.
Pursuant to an agreement instituted in 1972 and updated in 1975,
CS graders report violations to FDA so that it may enforce the FDCA. As a
result of this agreement, the CS services became markedly less attractive to pro-
ducers. In fact, subscription rates dropped o by roughly twenty-ve percent
following this agreement.82 More importantly, however, when the agreement
was amended in 1975 this sentence was added: \AMS [now CS] inspectors may
not act as FDA inspectors but their inspections and consultations with FDA
should reduce the necessity for FDA inspections [at plants with voluntary fruits
and vegetables inspections]."83 Given that CS inspection and grading exists
for the regulated industry rather than for consumer protection, \to the extent
this amendment indicates delegation by FDA of its inspection responsibilities
to AMS (CS) inspectors in the form of a presumption that CS plants have been
81Id., at 126
82Id., at 127
83Id., at 128
26adequately inspected for FDA purposes, it is troublesome."84
When President Roosevelt moved FDA out of USDA, he stated that
[t]he work of the FDA is unrelated to the basic function of the Department of
Agriculture. There was, however, no other agency to which these functions more
appropriately belonged until the Federal Security Agency was created last year.
I now believe that the opportunity for the FDA to develop along increasingly
constructive lines lies in this new agency.85
In an agreement with the FDA, signed on May 29, 1953, Howard Gordon of
the Production and Marketing Administration cited USDA's primary purpose
for engaging in poultry inspection as being \to assist producers in preparing
better quality products and to provide objective information by means of ocial
certication concerning the grade, quality or condition of a product which will
be of maximum assistance to all interested parties engaged in the marketing
functions."86 Assistant Secretary Butz explained that AMS had control over
the voluntary poultry inspection program because \the poultry-inspection work
is very closely allied to poultry marketing."87 During the hearings on S. 3176,
Representative Reidy confronted an ocial of the USDA on this issue:
Mr. Reidy: \In view of [the FDA inspectors' competence], why do you feel
so strongly that this health operation, to protect the health of the people, should
be placed in the Department of Agriculture whose primary function, I assume,
is to promote the prosperity of farmers?"
Mr. Butz: \I think there are two answers to that question. First, of course,
it is that we have a substantial volume of experience over the last 50 years in
red meats, and over a shorter period of time in poultry meats where we now
have these 425 inspectors working on the job so that we have the know-how
based on this, and we have the contacts with the industry to get the job done.
The second reason, I think, is that as I indicated a while ago, we regard this
inspection service as having a dual function. One is to protect the health of the
population, and the second is to increase consumer acceptance of an important
84Id.
85S. Rep. No. 129, note 24, at 3
86Id.
87Hearing on S. 3176, note 16, at 44
27agricultural product through the provision of a guaranty that you are getting a
wholesome and healthful product."88
In response to this less-than-convincing statement, Mr. Reidy pointed out
that if FDA protected health by safeguarding the integrity of processed foods,
consumer acceptance would follow just the same.89 In his lengthy testimony of
Shirley Barker, a representative of the poultry workers' union, provided a litany
of reasons why USDA, and in particular AMS, should not have authority.90
Barker was also the only witness who responded directly to the argument that
USDA's experience warranted its possession of the poultry inspection program:
Actually meat inspection is still in Agriculture because of a political accident.
The FDA was taken from that Department and put in the then-existing Federal
Security Agency by a reorganization act in 1940. Congress and the President
felt that a conict of interest existed in Agriculture.... Meat inspection was
left in Agriculture as a sop for the Department. However, some health groups
feel that any underlying conict still exists in keeping meat inspection in the
Department of Agriculture.91
Barker summed up his testimony by focusing on the conict of interest issue:
Even if poultry inspection were placed in the meat inspection branch of the
Bureau of Animal Industries [ARS], the FDA would still have to play a part in
assuring the consumer a clean and healthy product. FDA is the only agency
which can enforce rules of sanitation and healthfulness after a product leaves
the processing plant. Meat inspection's job is completed when the meat is
through processing. Only FDA can seize products contaminated in warehouses,
wholesale houses, markets, etc. An example of the diculties a split of authority
brings in the protection of consumers against injurious foods is contained in
a recent issue of the American Journal of Public Health. [This refers to a
milk contamination episode, which was caused in part by \cumbersome" dual
authority.]92
These sorts of criticisms did not disappear once the PPIA was enacted. In
the years since, numerous proposals have suggested reforming the regulation
88Id., at 32
89Id., at 33
90See Id., at 111 et seq
91Id., at 118-119
92Id., at 119
28of food by removing the responsibility for meat inspection from USDA. One
important such proposal occurred in 1972, when Senator Kennedy introduced
a bill (S. 3419) which would have created a new Food, Drug, and Consumer
Protection agency.93 The new regulatory body was to be composed essentially
of personnel from the FDA, but USDA stood to lose its meat inspection duties
under this consolidation plan. When read on the oor of the Senate,94 the bill
still contained this provision, but it was eliminated by amendment of Senator
Moss.95 The watered-down version which eventually emerged from Congress
was the Consumer Product Safety Act, which not only did not create a new
agency combining the food regulatory authority of FDA and USDA, it actually
stripped FDA of some consumer product responsibilities.
The author of the report, \A Case Study of the USDA and FDA,"
often cited in this paper, advocated removing the meat inspection functions from
USDA: \[w]e believe the bifurcated food regulation system should be unied in
a single agency.... Consolidation of food regulation has been recommended by
virtually every study of this area in recent years."96 Again the issue of USDA's
conict of interest occupied a central role. In conclusion, the author stated that
There is no rationale, other than an historic one, to justify maintaining two
separate, inconsistent and costly systems for inspecting and otherwise regulating
production of processed foods. [Transferring USDA's meat regulation respon-
sibilities to FDA] would eliminate a multitude of conicts, inconsistencies, and
inconveniences { to say nothing of the dual expense of administration { of all
these aspects of the food regulation system.
93See S. Rep. No. 835, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
94Congressional Record, July 21, 1972, pp. 21833, 21846
95Id., at 21854. Senator Moss explained that \in the interest of passing meaningful product
safety legislation in this Congress, I think it is advisable to delete from the bill the section
transferring the agricultural functions."
96\A Case Study of USDA and FDA," note 2, at 139
29...
Meat inspection [originally] was centered in USDA... largely because the Depart-
ment's sta included persons [in the Bureau of Chemistry] capable of carrying
it out. When Congress made poultry inspection mandatory, that function was
placed in USDA principally because poultry inspection was viewed as similar
to meat inspection... [T]he meat inspection activities [should be] within the
province of an agency whose mission includes the public's health.97
Finally, in 1993, as part of his \reinventing government" initiative, Vice Pres-
ident Al Gore issued a report which advocated removing the compulsory meat
and poultry inspection programs from USDA and placing them under the au-
thority of FDA.98 Although lauded by food safety experts and consumer groups,
this proposal was met by erce resistance from certain Members of Congress, as
well as from the meat industry and USDA.99 Having such power foes doomed
the proposal; it did not even lead to the introduction of any legislation or to
any Congressional hearings on the matter.
To conclude, this study, while not on the scale which a full analysis
of this topic demands, is sucient to illustrate several important issues. First
and most importantly, inecient and wasteful government bureaucracy costs
American lives. It cannot be understated that the system which now prevails
in the meat regulation eld does not maximize protection of our own public
health. The frustration would-be reformers have experience reects a second
and related point, namely that governmental regulation has an inertia all of its
97Id., at 139-140
98See Marian Burros, \Clinton Plan Would Move Meat and Poultry Inspection to FDA,"
New York Times, Sept. 13, 1993; James Worsham, \Plan calls for FDA to take over meat
inspection Shift is part of massive blueprint for overhauling Agriculture Department," Kansas
City Star, Sept. 8, 1993; Carol Bradley, \USDA bucks proposal to move meat inspection,"
Gannett News Service, Sept. 8, 1993; David Judson, \USDA urged to give up meat inspection
role," Gannett News Service, Sept. 20, 1993.
99See id.
30own. Often delegation of authority proceeds haphazardly and by historical acci-
dent; once established, authority tends to establish roots and become anchored
in place. The reason why our system has not been reformed has not been for
lack of recognition of its problems, nor has it been for lack of individual eort.
The failure of the would-be reforms is instead a testimonial to administrative
rivalry and Congressional conservatism (in its non-political sense).
Governmental change often proceeds in responses to crises. Arguably
national tragedies were what ultimately produced the PFDA and FMIA in
1906/1907, the FDCA in 1938, and the PPIA in 1957. One hopes that an-
other such event will not have to happen before our current system is updated.
But it took the E. coli infections in the Pacic Northwest to inspire investigation
and critique of USDA's methods of inspecting meat. The episode led directly to
proposals such as Al Gore's and in fact gave the impetus necessary to achieve
modest reform of USDA procedure. This all occurred after more than a decade
of silence on the issue.
Today sentiment that USDA's policy of continuous inspection is outdated
and wasteful is gaining sway. If these development persist, along with the in-
creasing recognition that USDA's approach to meat inspection may actually be
inadequate to eectively meet the health problems faced today, one wonders if
in the not to distant future, perhaps Congress will consider reorganization of the
food regulation system. Based on the evidence presented in this paper, I hope
it is fairly clear that to eect any meaningful remedy of the current situation,
31consolidation of the duties of USDA and FDA is a must. This follows both
because of the problems introduced by dual regulatory authority and because
of uncertainty over the extent of USDA's commitment to consumer protection.
32